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I. INTRODUCTION
Expert testimony is common in tort litigation, especially on issues
of standard of care and cause-in-fact. Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence1 and its state counterparts abolished the prohibition of testi-
mony on ultimate issues, leading to the possibility of expert testimony
on the often crucial issue of proximate cause. The situation is easy to
imagine. After counsel has qualified an expert witness and elicited an
opinion that the particular act or omission "caused" the injury in ques-
tion, counsel might very well be tempted to inquire whether the witness
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law.
** Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law.
*** Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law.
1. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defend-
ant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of
a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
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has an opinion as to whether the act or omission was a "proximate" or
"legal" cause of the accident. Or, counsel may merge the two lines of
inquiry and ask whether the act or omission "proximately resulted" in
the accident or injury to the plaintiff. The inquiry seems harmless. The
term "proximate" is commonly understood to mean only "near" or
"close to."2 The question is not innocuous, however. The issue of expert
testimony on the question of proximate cause implicates several restric-
tions on expert testimony that survive the broad permission of Rule
704, and touches upon the serious issue of the proper roles of expert
and fact-finder in the application of law to facts. The few published
cases that have considered the issue of expert testimony on proximate
cause are split.' The question arises far more often, however, than is
indicated by the relative scarcity of reported decisions.4
This Article addresses the usefulness and propriety of expert testi-
mony on the issue of proximate cause. After briefly defining the concept
of proximate cause, this Article argues that expert testimony on proxi-
mate cause is inadmissible under Rule 704, despite the general admissi-
bility of testimony on ultimate issues. In addition, opinion on
proximate cause is inadmissible because it fails to clear the separate
hurdles of Rules 702' and 4036 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A
technical expert on standard of care or actual cause is not qualified to
opine on the issue of proximate cause and thus fails the expertise test
of Rule 702. Furthermore, even the testimony of a genuine expert on
the issue of proximate cause should be excluded because such testimony
fails the helpfulness test of Rule 702. Finally, expert testimony on the
issue of proximate cause is inadmissible under Rule 403 because its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the possibility that such tes-
2. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1145 (2d college ed.
1982).
3. Intermediate appellate courts in Ohio have permitted experts to testify in terms of the
"proximate cause" of an injury, though the issue in dispute in both cases was the actual cause of
the injury. Brooks v. Piwinski, No. 47965 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1984); Fidelity & Guar. Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Gary Douglas Elec., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 319, 357 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1974).
Alabama bars expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause. Underwood v. Smith, 261 Ala. 181,
189-90, 73 So. 2d 717, 725 (1954) (proximate cause "is a juridical question, not one of expert
knowledge. It involves many questions not of an expert nature, some are legal and some factual");
see also Thompson v. White, 274 Ala. 413, 149 So. 2d 797, 803 (1963). The Texas courts prohibit
expert testimony on proximate cause on the ground that the question is one for the jury, Hall v.
Birchfield, 718 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), and that the term as used by witnesses
confusingly implies the legal definition. Garza v. Berelanga, 598 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).
4. See, e.g., Schaefer, Low-Cost Shadow Juries, 22 TRIAL, Dec. 1986, at 58.
5. FED. R. EVID. 702 (governing the testimony of experts); see infra notes 56-95 & 103-10 and
accompanying text.
6. FED. R. EvID. 403 (allowing judge to exclude relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time); see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
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timony will confuse the issues and mislead the jury.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROXIMATE CAUSE INQUIRY
To understand the relevance of expert testimony to the issue of
proximate or legal cause,7 some background is necessary. On the sur-
face, the topic does not sound difficult. The terms "proximate" and
"cause" are not unusual or difficult terms. In practice, however, the
concept of proximate cause has little to do with proximity.8 Further-
more, it is difficult to define and even more difficult to apply. A
respected commentator has described proximate cause issues as "noto-
riously difficult,"9 and the leading treatise describes the concept as
"something that is difficult, if not impossible, to put into words." 10
Courts, too, have recognized the difficulty of the subject of proximate
cause. As the New York Court of Appeals stated: "The concept of prox-
imate cause, or more appropriately legal cause, has proven to be an elu-
sive one, incapable of being precisely defined to cover all situations."'11
7. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has substituted the term "legal cause" for the term
"proximate cause" in an attempt to limit confusion. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977).
As stated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610
(1st Cir. 1955) (citations omitted):
The adjective "proximate," as commonly used in this connection is perhaps misleading, since
to establish liability it is not necessarily true that the defendant's culpable act must be shown
to have been the next or immediate cause of the plaintiff's injury. In many familiar instances,
the defendant's act may be more remote in the chain of events; and the plaintiff's injury may
more immediately have been caused by an intervening force of nature, or an intervening act
of a third person whether culpable or not, or even an act by the plaintiff bringing himself in
contact with the dangerous situation resulting from the defendant's negligence. . . . There-
fore, perhaps, the phrase "legal cause," as used in Am.L.Inst., Rest. of Torts § 431, is prefera-
ble to "proximate cause"; but the courts continue generally to use "proximate cause", and it
is pretty well-understood what is meant.
The issue of proximate cause occupies a significant place in torts casebooks. See, e.g., G.
CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264-328 (1983); D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COM-
PENSATION 197-231 (1985); R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
309-49 (4th ed. 1984); M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNA-
TIVES 239-83 (4th ed. 1987); L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J.
TREECE, TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 348-49, 595-600, 610-13, 674-79 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter L.
GREEN]; J. HENDERSON & R PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 506-61, 763-65 (2d ed. 1981); W. PROS-
SER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 299-380 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter
W. PROSSER].
8. As Professor Robert Keeton has noted in stating his preference for the term "legal cause":
"Many others, especially at the bench and bar, prefer to use the phrase 'proximate cause.' I offer
no protest against their practice so long as there is common recognition that 'proximate cause' is a
phrase of art and that proximity is not the point." R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORT
viii (1963).
9. D. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 220.
10. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 300 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
11. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670, 434
N.Y.S.2d 166, 169, (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted that "[t]here is no
subject in the field of law upon which more has been written with less
elucidation than that of proximate cause.
'12
The precise meaning of "proximate cause" is of particular impor-
tance because, in most jurisdictions, the jury decides the question of the
proximate or legal cause of an injury, an issue that can be outcome de-
terminative. If the jury determines that the defendant was negligent in
his or her conduct and that the negligence actually caused some injury
to another party, the inquiry then shifts to whether the defendant
should be legally responsible for the harm or injury caused to the plain-
tiff.13 In effect the jury is being asked to apply "policy considerations
that serve to place manageable limits upon the liability that flows from
negligent conduct.' 4 This stems from a "wide-spread conviction,"
noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, that
"it would be disproportionately burdensome to hold a culpable actor
potentially liable for all the injurious consequences that may flow from
his act, i.e., that would not have been inflicted 'but for' the occurrence
of the act.'
5
To perform this limiting function, the jury is most often asked to
determine the issue of proximate cause by using the concept of foresee-
ability. Under this approach, the liability of a negligent actor is con-
fined to those consequences that would have been foreseeable to a
reasonably prudent person at the time the actor took the action or inac-
tion which rendered him or her negligent.' 6 In other words, the defend-
ant is liable only if the consequences fall within the range of results
that were foreseeable at the time of the defendant's action. In making
this determination, the jury will have to determine, first, whether the
plaintiff was a foreseeable plaintiff, i.e., was he or she within the scope
of the foreseeable risk created by defendant's conduct,17 and, second,
12. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 453, 107 N.W.2d 859, 860 (1961).
13. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 264, 320-21.
14. Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 314, 414 N.E.2d at 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
15. Marshall, 222 F.2d at 610.
16. The traditional proximate cause analysis with its focus on foreseeability is discussed in R
KEETON, supra note 8, at 41-45. Others advocate a duty-risk analysis in which foreseeability is not
linked to cause analysis but rather is used only as a factor to help determine duty and negligence.
See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 570-72 (1962);
Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); see also Probert, Causa-
tion in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced "Realism," 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 369 (1965);
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk Versus Proximate Cause, and the Rational Allocation of Func-
tions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1.
17. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf is-viewed as "the most renowned exposition of the theory that a
negligent defendant is not liable to persons outside the range of reasonably foreseeable harm." R
KEETON, supra note 8, at 119. As Professor Keeton noted, "[S]ince the rendition of the Palsgraf
264 [Vol. 41:261
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whether the occurrence itself, the way in which plaintiff was harmed,
was within the scope of foreseeable consequences.' 8 While not all juris-
dictions apply the foreseeability theory to issues of proximate cause, it
is considered the dominant view. 9 For purposes of this Article, jurisdic-
tions applying the foreseeability test are the most relevant because the
foreseeability approach results in resolution of most proximate cause
issues by the trier of fact.20
In those jurisdictions adopting the foreseeability approach, the jury
is instructed to determine what the defendant did foresee or should
have foreseen. For example, model jury instructions used in Nebraska
provide:
By "proximate cause" is meant a moving or effective cause or fault which, in a
natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), pro-
duces the (harm, accident, injury, collision, occurrence) which otherwise would not
decision in 1928, hundreds of judges and commentators and thousands of students and lawyers
have spent millions of hours in the communication of billions of thoughts about the Palsgraf prob-
lem." Id. at 120.
18. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). In a now classic
opinion, Judge Henry Friendly discussed the foreseeability issue and held that the foreseeability of
danger test for liability was satisfied when the damage was caused by the very forces-current, ice,
and size of the ship-that created a duty to take greater care than was taken in tying up the ship.
Id. at 723-25. Foreseeable damages are compensable even if they occur in a somewhat unforesee-
able manner. Furthermore, in personal injury cases, courts long have held that the defendant takes
the plaintiff as he finds him and is responsible for the full extent of an injury, even though the
plaintiff was a particularly susceptible individual due to some pre-existing condition. PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 10, at 291-93.
19. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 297. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however,
rejected the foreseeability test in Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961). In
Dellwo the defendant's motor boat crossed and snagged the plaintiff's fishing line, pulling down
the plaintiff's fishing rod. The fishing reel broke on the side of the boat and part of the reel struck
the plaintiff in the eye. In overturning a verdict for the defendant, the court ruled that the trial
court erred in making foreseeability a test of proximate cause. Quoting Christianson v. Chicago, St.
P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 96, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896), the court stated:
What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining
whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the
proximate cause of an injury which ensues. If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate
that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act
would not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is
equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could have foreseen
them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the act is one which the party ought, in
the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then
he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have antici-
pated the particular injury which did happen. Consequences which follow in unbroken se-
quence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and
proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he
could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow.
Dellwo, 259 Minn. at 455-56, 107 N.W.2d at 861-62. In summary, the court stated that "negligence
is tested by foresight but proximate cause is determined by hindsight." Id. at 456, 107 N.W.2d at
862.
20. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 7, at 509.
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have occurred.
A "proximate result" is that result brought about or produced by a proximate
cause. It must have been a natural and probable consequence which was, or ought
to have been, reasonably foreseen or anticipated in the light of attendant circum-
stances. (It is not required, however, that the particular [harm, accident, injury,
collision, occurrence], or the precise nature and extent thereof, or the exact manner
of its happening, was or should have been foreseen.)"1
Similarly, model jury instructions used in Texas provide, in part, that
"in order to be a proximate cause the act or omission complained of
must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen the
event, or some similar event, which might reasonably result
therefrom.
'22
The question must be asked, however, whether the jury can under-
stand these instructions and the role it is to perform. To understand
the issue of proximate cause, if any person can, a juror would have to be
given a far more thorough indoctrination in the law than provided by
the above instructions. As Professor Leon Green has asked: "[c]an a
jury be given a law school education concerning the various policies that
should be considered? Should it be done? ' 23 The problem, of course, is
that more words will not necessarily lead to more understanding. 24 As
Professor Page Keeton has described the process, the jury is being
asked to perform an "evaluative determination" whereby it applies the
legal standard of foreseeability to the determined facts.25 Under this
view, the jury resolves two kinds of questions if reasonable persons
could disagree about them: first, the traditional fact question and, sec-
ond, the evaluative application of legal standards to the facts.26
In summary, the law of proximate cause is neither uniform nor
clear. Despite widespread agreement on the complexity of the subject,
juries routinely are instructed to determine whether the defendant's
conduct was the "proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injury, even though
21. Nebraska Jury Instructions 3.41 (1969), reprinted in W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 369.
22. Texas Pattern Jury Charge § 203, reprinted in W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 370; see
Marshall v. Joske's, Inc., 581 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (indicating that "[u]nder
Texas law, proximate cause consists of two elements, which are cause in fact and foreseeability").
23. L. GREEN, supra note 7, at 678.
24. In discussing an Oregon jury instruction that defined proximate cause as occurring when
the damage "is the natural or probable result of the negligence and such as might have been rea-
sonably foreseen as leading to damage of the general nature claimed in this case," Justice Alfred
Goodwin noted that the "instruction is talking about ultimate legal liability-not about causation.
The jury, however, is not in on this secret. It is invited to think about causation." Stoneburner v.
Greyhound Corp., 232 Or. 567, 575, 375 P.2d 812, 816 (Or. 1962) (Goodwin, J., specially
concurring).
25. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 320. Professor Monaghan divides this process into
two stages: norm elaboration and law application. See infra text accompanying notes 74-95.
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 320.
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the concept involves neither "proximity"27 nor "cause."2 8 It is impor-
tant to keep these considerations in mind when determining how the
rules of evidence should apply to expert testimony that purports to ad-
vise the jury on the subject of proximate cause.
III. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER RULE 704: TESTIMONY ON AN ULTIMATE
ISSUE
Prior to abolition of the rule excluding testimony as to ultimate
issues, expert opinion on the issue of proximate cause would have been
excluded as a matter of course. The rule, which developed in American
courts in the nineteenth century, excluded lay or expert opinion upon
an ultimate issue on the ground that such an opinion "invaded the
province of the jury" or "usurped the function of the jury."29 The rule
and its formalistic rationale were condemned by the classical commen-
tators.30 Wigmore, for example, termed the rule "a bit of empty rheto-
ric" and pointed out correctly that a witness-lay or expert-could not
usurp the jury's function because the jury could always choose to reject
the witness' testimony.3 1 Commentators also noted the serious practical
liabilities of the ultimate issue rule. For example, the rule required a
court to distinguish ultimate facts from mediate or non-ultimate facts;32
a task that in practice is almost impossible.33
A more significant disadvantage of the ultimate issue rule was that
it could preclude admission of the most relevant evidence in the case.
Thus, in a criminal prosecution the rule could produce the absurd re-
sult of prohibiting an eyewitness from testifying that the accused was
27. See supra note 8.
28. It has been aptly noted that "[c]ourts and lawyers are also prone to confuse the relatively
simple issue of factual causation--'Did the party's conduct contribute to plaintiff's injury?'-with
the more complex policy issue of who should bear legal responsibility for what happened." L.
GREEN, supra note 7, at 612.
29. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 1 704[01], at 704-6 (1981); Stoebuck,
Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends and a Note of Caution, 41 DEN. L.J. 226, 227 (1964).
The ultimate opinion doctrine seemed to have had the support of the Supreme Court at one time.
See United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935).
30. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 12, at 26 (1954); E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
218 (1962); 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (3d ed. 1940).
31. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 1920, at 18-19.
32. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 704-6; Note, Opinion Testimony and
Ultimate Issues: Incompatible?, 51 Ky. L.J. 540, 542 (1963).
33. The difficulty of this distinction is not terribly surprising to students of code pleading,
which required pleading of ultimate facts and not evidence. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 3.7 (3d ed. 1985). The desire to eliminate wasteful arguments over what is and is not
an ultimate fact was one of the motivations for abandoning code pleading in favor of the notice
pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The distinction between "ultimate" and
"mediate" facts also caused difficulty in the discussion of collateral estoppel. Id. § 11.18; see also
The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944).
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the robber, since the identity of the accused as the culprit is the ulti-
mate issue in the case.34 Influenced by such defects, the courts began to
abandon the ultimate issue rule. 5 By 1974, when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were adopted, the abolition of the ultimate issue prohibition
by Rule 704 did not produce a significant change in existing practice.3 6
Rule 704(a) provides that "testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. '37 Although a pro-
ponent of expert opinion on proximate cause certainly will rely on Rule
704(a), its abolition of the ultimate issue doctrine does not mean that
all opinions on ultimate issues are rendered automatically admissible.
Opinion testimony-whether on an ultimate issue or not-still must
meet the standards set out in Rules 702 and 403.38 Thus the opinion
testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact,' and the probative value
of the opinion testimony must exceed the counterweights to its
admission.40
Courts construing Rule 704(a) have imposed a sensible restriction
on ultimate issue testimony: the witness may not testify "in terms of
inadequately explored legal criteria. '41 The Advisory Committee Notes
recognize the importance of this limitation and illustrate it with the
following example:
The question "Did T have capacity to make a will?" would be excluded, while the
34. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 692 (1979).
35. See Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281, 285 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Chief Justice (then
Judge) Warren Burger noted that courts had "long tolerated violation" of the rule. See 3 J. WEiN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 704-9.
36. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 34, at 691.
37. FED. R. EVID. 704(a). Rule 704(a) (then Rule 704) did not provoke any controversy during
the rulemaking process; the version enacted by Congress is identical to the draft promulgated by
the Supreme Court. See FED. R. EVID. 704(a) editorial note; 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra
note 34, at 693. In 1984 Rule 704 was amended. Codified as Rule 704(b), the amendment carved
out a narrow exception to the general principle of Rule 704(a):
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not
have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a de-
fense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b). The purpose of the amendment was to "eliminate the confusing spectacle of
competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions." S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1983). The report also quotes a statement by the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation to the effect that a psychiatrist who testifies to the ultimate issue of legal sanity testifies
outside the area of his medical expertise. See infra notes 67 & 100, for additional discussion of the
amendment and its purposes.
38. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 284 (1972).
39. FED. R. EVID. 701(b), 702; see infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
40. FED. R. EVID. 403; see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
41. See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at 284; see also
infra notes 43-51 and cases cited therein.
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question "Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of
his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational
scheme of distribution?" would be allowed.2
The defect in the first quoted question (remedied in the second) is that
the witness, if not trained in the law, may rely on an erroneous inter-
pretation of the governing legal standard and convey that misinterpre-
tation to the jury in his opinion testimony.
The danger of expert opinion "in terms of inadequately explored
legal criteria" is maximized when the standard is a legal "term of art
which has a refined and specified legal meaning which is not readily
apparent to the witness. '4 3 In such cases the misinterpretation of the
standard by the witness and the transmission of the error to the jury is
almost guaranteed. Several courts have adopted a common sense strat-
egy to deal with these cases, which focuses on "whether the terms used
by the witness have a separate, distinct specialized meaning in the law
different from that present in the vernacular." 4 When the legal term
bears the same meaning in the vernacular that it does in the specialized
language of the law, there is little possibility of expert witness or jury
confusion. On the other hand, if the precise legal definition of the term
differs from its meaning in ordinary language, confusion is virtually as-
sured. Thus, courts employing this test have permitted experts to opine
that a person suffered "serious bodily injury, '45 had "an intent to dis-
tribute" illegal drugs,46 or "voluntarily" participated in a bank rob-
bery.47 On the other hand, courts have excluded opinions that a railroad
crossing was "ultra hazardous," 48 that a product was "unreasonably
dangerous, 49 that defendant had a "fiduciary" relationship to plain-
tiff,50 or that defendant had "discriminated" against plaintiff.51
Applying this common sense test to the problem of proximate
cause yields a clear conclusion. The word "proximate" in ordinary Eng-
lish means only "near" or "close to";52 the meaning of the word "cause"
in ordinary English approximates the legal notion of actual cause.5 3
Thus, if the term "proximate cause" has any meaning in ordinary Eng-
42. See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at 284.
43. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 34, at 696.
44. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985).
45. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980).
46. United States v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982).
47. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. Stoler v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 583 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1978).
49. Strong v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981).
50. Christiansen v. National Say. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
51. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985).
52. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1145 (2d college ed.
1982).
53. Id. at 226; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 265.
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lish idiom, 4 it would be "near cause" or perhaps simply "cause." The
term "proximate cause" in the language of the law, however, has a far
different meaning that incorporates notions of foreseeability of types of
damage, classes of plaintiffs, and types of intervening events.5 Thus, if
an expert on medicine, police science, or metallurgy is asked for an
opinion about the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the expert is
almost certain to misunderstand the question and transmit his error to
the jury. The jurors, of course, know nothing of the legal intricacies of
proximate causation and surely will hear the expert's conclusion as a
legal opinion on cause-in-fact. Further, the notion of proximate cause is
quite abstruse and counter-intuitive to the average lay juror. An in-
struction on the meaning of proximate cause, coming as it does in the
midst of a set of oral instructions lasting thirty or forty minutes that is
delivered long after the expert has offered his opinion, will be insuffi-
cient to overcome the erroneous view of both the expert and the jury
that the rather strange sounding locution means anything more than
"'cause."
In sum, Rule 704(a)'s abolition of the ultimate issue doctrine does
not guarantee admissibility of expert opinion on the ultimate issue of
proximate cause. The confusion engendered by expert testimony in
terms of "inadequately explored legal criteria," however, is but one rea-
son to bar such testimony. Analysis under Rules 702 and 403 reveals
others.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER RULES 702 AND 403
A. Rule 702: Testimony by Experts
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counter-
parts56 permit a witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education" to testify by opinion or otherwise if
the witness' special knowledge "will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. '57 The Rule thus
contains two prerequisites to the admissibility of expert testimony: ap-
propriate expertise on the part of the witness and helpfulness of the
54. Very probably the term has no meaning at all in ordinary English. There is no entry for
the term "proximate cause" in either Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language
or the Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary.
55. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 279.
56. As of May 1987, 26 states had adopted rules of evidence that included a rule identical to
Federal Rule 702; five other states had adopted versions that were substantially similar to Rule
702. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 702[06], at 702-31 to 702-39, 415-44 (Cune.
Supp. 1987).
57. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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expert opinion to the trier of fact. 8 Satisfaction of these two require-
ments permits the expert to testify, even on the ultimate issues in the
case, despite a lack of personal knowledge of the matter on trial. 9
Expert opinion on the issue of proximate cause may encompass two
components: first, opinion on the actual cause, or "cause-in-fact" of the
injury, since cause-in-fact is often treated as a necessary element of the
larger issue of proximate cause; 0 and, second, opinion as to whether the
actual cause was the "legal" or "proximate cause" of the injury. Expert
testimony on cause-in-fact, by itself, presents no great difficulty under
Rule 702 if the trier of fact may benefit from scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge and the witness is qualified to provide that
knowledge. In this situation the expert is merely assisting the jury in its
fact finding role. Expert testimony on the actual cause of injury in tort
actions is a common feature of current litigation. 1 Indeed, some of the
cases permitting expert testimony on "proximate cause" really concern
the initial question of cause-in-fact or actual cause, and can be better
understood on that ground.
6 2
Expert testimony on proximate or legal cause, however, is more
problematic. There are two theories of proximate or legal cause in
American law:
One of these theories is that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but
not beyond the scope of the "foreseeable risks"-that is, the risks by reason of
which the actor's conduct is held to be negligent. The second ... theory is that the
58. As is often said, the question under Rule 702 is: can the jury receive assistance on this
subject from this person? 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923, at 29 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978).
59. Expert testimony thus constitutes an exception to Rule 602's general command that "[a]
witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding
that he has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EvID. 602. The third sentence of Rule 602
specifically exempts expert testimony from its coverage: "[tihis rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses." Rule 703 allows an expert to express
opinions based on facts of which he does not have personal knowledge. However, a witness must be
found qualified to testify as an expert under Rule 702 before the personal knowledge exception of
Rule 703 comes into play.
Furthermore, if a witness meets Rule 702's two-fold threshold, the door is opened to the spe-
cial testimonial procedures provided by Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence: testimony by
the witness in the form of opinion or by "a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other princi-
ples relevant to the case" (FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note); the witness' statement of
opinions or inferences and reasons therefore on direct examination "without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data unless the court requires otherwise" (FED. R. EvID. 705); and the admissi-
bility of opinion based on facts or data not personally known to the witness or otherwise admissi-
ble in evidence if of the kind reasonably relied upon by experts in her field (FED. R. EvID. 703). See
Sutton, Article VII: Opinions and Expert Testimony, 20 Hous. L. REV. 445, 451-52 (1983).
60. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 264.
61. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 1976, at 168-89; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at
270.
62. See, e.g., Bosse v. Ideco Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 412 F.2d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1969);
Thompson v. White, 274 Ala. 413, 419-20, 149 So. 2d 797, 803-05 (1963); Brooks v. Piwinski, No.
47965 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1984).
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scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond all "direct" (or "di-
rectly traceable") consequences and those indirect consequences that are
foreseeable.1
3
Whichever theory a jurisdiction applies will be embodied in its jury in-
structions. Under the first theory of proximate cause, the judge will di-
rect the jury to determine, for example, whether the injury was "the
natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, and that [the
injury] ought to have been foreseen-not necessarily the precise actual
injury, but some like injury likely to result therefrom." '64 An instruction
expressing the second theory describes proximate cause as "that cause
which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."'6 5
The jury's task is thus to determine the historical facts and assess
them under the applicable definition of proximate cause contained in
the court's instructions. This involves a classic instance of law applica-
tion, or what is sometimes called a mixed question of law and fact or a
determination of the existence of ultimate fact.6 A witness who gives
her opinion that the acts or omissions of the defendant constitute the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries implicitly states in conclusory
form that the plaintiff's injuries were within the scope of the "foresee-
able risks" or were "directly traceable" to the defendant's conduct. The
questions under Rule 702 are: first, whether the witness possesses the
requisite expertise to render an opinion on the issue of proximate cause;
and, second, whether such an opinion would be helpful to the jury in
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.
1. Expertise
The issue of proximate cause is different from that of the actual
cause of the injury. Whether the witness is qualified by knowledge,
63. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 273; see also Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law
of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 413-15 (1984).
64. Idaho jury instruction approved in 1951, cited in 4 E. BRANSON, THE LAW OF INSTRUC-
TIONS TO JURIES 389 (A. Reid repl. 3d ed. 1962).
65. Cable v. Johnson, 63 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933) (quoting George v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 286 S.W. 130, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926)).
66. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-
TION OF LAW 369-81 (tent. ed. 1958); see also J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW 62-83 (1898); Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Be-
tween the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993, 996 & n.19, 1002-03 (1986); Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 232-37 (1985); Stern, Review of Findings of
Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 93-124 (1944);




skill, experience, training, or education to render an opinion on the ex-
istence vel non of proximate cause is therefore separate and distinct
from the question of the witness' technical expertise on actual cause.
Professor Maguire illustrated the distinction between technical exper-
tise and the expertise needed to apply the technical conclusion in a
legal context with the following example:
For instance, lawyers are now and then stumped by a successful objection to the
request: "Now, doctor, state whether in your opinion the deceased was competent
to make a will." They should remember that while the medico may be fully compe-
tent to appraise mental condition, he does not necessarily have accurate knowledge
of the legal formula for testamentary capacity.
7
Buried within counsel's conclusory question to the witness is a hidden
inquiry into the content of the appropriate legal standard, a subject
that is beyond the witness' technical expertise.
Case law under Rule 702 supports the refusal to permit expert tes-
timony that is beyond the witness' field of expertise.0 s Ordinarily, an
expert testifying on actual cause by reason of scientific, medical, or
technical expertise will have no special knowledge, skill, experience, or
training on either the meaning of the term "proximate cause" or its
application to the facts of the case. This lack of expertise alone should
bar experts on actual cause from giving their opinions on proximate
cause.
6 9
Who, then, would have the requisite background to give expert tes-
timony on proximate cause? In the rare instances in which expert testi-
mony on the application of law to fact has been admitted as helpful to
the trier of fact,70 courts have found law professors,71 experienced prac-
67. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 31 (1947). Compare the 1984
amendment to Rule 704 that bars experts testifying on the defendant's mental state or condition
from giving an opinion as to whether or not the defendant had the mental state constituting an
element of the crime or defense. FED. R. EviD. 704(b). The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report, S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983) (quoting the American Psychiatric Association
Statement on the Insanity Defense 18-19 (Dec. 1982)), states: "[I]t is clear that psychiatrists are
experts in medicine, not law."
68. See, e.g., United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1984); Rimer v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 641 F.2d 450, 456 (6th Cir. 1981).
69. But see Brooks v. Piwinski, No. 47965 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1984) (physician permitted
to testify in terms of proximate cause); Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Gary Douglas
Elec., Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 319, 322-23, 357 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1974) (arson investigator should be
permitted to testify in terms of both actual and proximate cause). The lack of expertise on proxi-
mate cause should not bar a technical expert from testifying when the expert testifies in terms of
foreseeability of the risk, rather than in terms of proximate cause itself. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
70. See infra note 81.
71. See Crom Corp. v. Crom, 677 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1982) (practitioner and lecturer in
patent law qualified to testify as expert); United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94-95 (5th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (government proffered expert who taught and practiced tax law on the issue of
taxability of money received from sale of blood antibodies); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F.
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
titioners,7 2 and judges 3 to be qualified as experts. If such testimony on
the issue of proximate cause is otherwise admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, it should come only from witnesses with the knowl-
edge, experience, or education that long practice or academic inquiry
provide. Prosser or Keeton would be the ideal expert witnesses on prox-
imate cause. Whether even the most qualified expert witness on proxi-
mate cause should be permitted to testify on this issue, however,
requires an examination of the helpfulness of the testimony to the trier
of fact.
2. Helpfulness to the Trier of Fact
To determine the issue of proximate cause, the jury, as the trier of
fact, must first find the historical facts and then assess them in terms of
the legal standard contained in the court's instructions. This assess-
ment involves two phases: first, further refinement of the legal standard
(norm elaboration); and, second, application of that elaborated norm to
the historical facts. Under Rule 702, expert assistance with either of
these functions must "assist the trier of fact to . . . determine a fact in
issue" in order to be admissible. Helpfulness to the jury as trier of fact
requires an examination of the value of expert opinion on both of these
functions, as well as consideration of any countervailing drawbacks.
Norm elaboration involves the jury's attempt to refine the legal
standard contained in the court's instructions. As Professor Henry P.
Monaghan has pointed out:
If all legal propositions could be formulated in great detail, [law application] . . .
would be rather mechanical and require no distinctive consideration. But such is
not the case. Linking the rule to the conduct is a complex psychological process,
one that often involves judgment. The more general the rule, the larger the domain
for judgment. Thus, law application frequently entails some attempt to elaborate
the governing norm. 4
A jury applying the court's instructions on proximate cause would en-
gage in "norm elaboration" by further refining the terms "foreseeabil-
ity" or "direct consequences." This process may occur explicitly during
deliberations or implicitly in the jury's discussion and resolution of the
Supp. 879, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982) (law professor expert on federal income taxation qualified to testify to material misrep-
resentations and omissions in accounting firm opinion letter).
72. See Garber, 607 F.2d at 95-97 (defendant proffered certified public accountant and for-
mer revenue agent on issue of taxability of money received from sale of blood antibodies). But see
DiBella v. Suffolk County, 574 F. Supp. 151, 152-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1990 (2d Cir.
1985) (testimony of experienced prosecutor proffered as expert on existence of probable cause for
arrest held inadmissible).
73. In re Estate of Seelig, 2 Ohio App. 3d 223, 224-25, 441 N.E.2d 598, 600-01 (1981).




Expert opinion on the issue of proximate cause is unlikely to assist
the jury in its norm elaboration function. First, an expert rarely makes
explicit the norm elaboration underlying his or her opinion. The ex-
pert's testimony is often delivered in conclusory form, simply stating
that "X was proximately caused by Y." Such conclusory testimony
hides the expert's own implicit process of norm elaboration. Theoreti-
cally, at least, this difficulty can be surmounted by the opponent's ex-
ploration on cross-examination of the expert's underlying premises.75
A more serious objection is that, for policy reasons, legal standards
are often left at a general level and not further elaborated in jury in-
structions or by appellate courts. The reasonable man standard in neg-
ligence is an oft-cited example.76 The question of what a reasonable
person would have done under the circumstances is generally for the
jury, because of "the public's desire to have its conduct judged by the
layman ('the man on the street') rather than by the more sophisticated
and expert judgment of the trained lawyer, whose judicial experience
may have given him a biased point of view."' 77 The same arguments
counsel against presenting the jury with an expert's more detailed defi-
nition of proximate cause,78 which, it has been pointed out, is ultimately
only a formula to limit the scope of liability based on notions of justice
and administrative efficiency.79 Proximate cause is defined in relatively
general terms precisely because we want the jury to apply its own expe-
rience and values to any further norm elaboration, a process that is pur-
posely kept invisible and case specific.8 0 Expert testimony explicitly
suggesting a more precise standard by which to evaluate the issue of
proximate cause undermines this goal.
Furthermore, if the jury is to be given a more specific definition of
proximate cause, that instruction should come from the judge, not an
75. FED. R EvID. 705 permits expert opinion without prior disclosure of the underlying facts
or data, although such facts or data must be disclosed on cross-examination. It may be that eluci-
dation of the basis for the expert's opinion will do the cross-examiner more harm than good by
either bolstering the expert's testimony or confusing the jury with definitional disputes. In other
words, Rule 705 may not protect adequately against conclusory opinions on law application.
76. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 237.
77. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 116 (1924); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 237; James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 668, 685-87 (1949) (jury is supposed to bring "the common sense wisdom of the
layman to bear on the problems of finding facts" and evaluating conduct).
78. 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.6, at 172-73 (2d ed. 1986)
(indicating that although "it may be undesirable to entrust the jury with almost complete discre-
tion in imposing liability, a single rule or formula that attempts to reduce all the cases to a simple
pattern may not be any more desirable").
79. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at 264.
80. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 236; see also infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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expert witness, for the same reasons that experts are generally barred
from expounding the law to the jury.8' Such testimony is prohibited
because the special legal knowledge of the judge makes the witness' tes-
timony superfluous, 2 and because "the jury may think that the 'expert'
in the particular branch of the law knows more than the judge. ' 3 In
addition, expert testimony on the law extends the battle of experts
before the jury to yet another front. It also raises the possibility of con-
siderable objection and argument before the trial judge on the legal cor-
rectness of the expert's opinions. For all of these reasons, expert
testimony elaborating on the meaning of proximate cause should be re-
jected under Rule 702 as unhelpful to the jury.
Evaluation of the usefulness of expert testimony in the second as-
pect of the jury's assessment of the evidence-application of the elabo-
rated norm on proximate cause to the historical facts-involves a
number of different but related considerations. As discussed above, the
only witness even arguably qualified to render an opinion on the exis-
tence of proximate cause is one familiar with the case law on that sub-
ject. 4 The expert's opinion amounts, in effect, to a statement that the
applicable precedents, as she interprets them, dictate a particular result
under an assumed set of facts. The expert thus is injecting her view of
precedent into the jury's application of the law to the facts.
Expert opinion of this type ties the jury's law application process
more to precedent than otherwise would be the case. At one extreme of
"precedentiality" is the jury's application of the law uninformed by ei-
ther judicial or expert views of how this case fits with prior applications
of the law. At the other extreme is the application of precedent, in the
81. United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984); Stoler v. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 583 F.2d 896, 899 (6th Cir. 1978); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 508-10
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12, at 31 (3d ed.
1984); 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 1952, at 103. In United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94-97
(5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), expert testimony on the taxability under the Internal Revenue Code of
the sale of blood antibodies was held admissible as relevant to the issue of willfulness by showing
that the defendant was not aware of the tax liability or simply made an error in judgment. See
Note, United States v. Garber: The Propriety of Expert Legal Testimony, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 447
(1982). Expert testimony on the state of the law also may be appropriate when the objective legal
reasonableness of action taken under color of law is at issue. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
343-44 (1986); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818-19 (1982); Laverne v. Corning, 376 F. Supp. 836, 838-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afl'd, 522 F.2d
1144 (2d Cir. 1975). Two recent law review articles advocate expanded admissibility of expert testi-
mony on the law, though mainly as an aid to the court in its law declaration function rather than
to the jury in its law application role. Friedland, Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or
Justifiable?, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1983); Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARv. L. REV. 797
(1984).
82. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 1952, at 103.
83. Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 512.
84. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
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form of reported decisions, which apply the legal standard to cases sim-
ilar to the case at bar. Law application at this extreme becomes a ques-
tion of law for the court. In The Common Law Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued for this position. Believing that "the tendency of the law must
always be to narrow the field of uncertainty," ' Holmes suggested that
the lessons of prior jury law application be distilled into legal rules to
be applied by the court on motions for directed verdict:
[S]upposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the
court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever? Is it not manifest, on the
contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a tribunal as it is represented to
be, the lesson which can be got from that source will be learned? Either the court
will find that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct complained of
usually is or is not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained, is or is not a
ground of liability; or it will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the
necessity of making up its mind for itself. There is no reason why any other such
question should not be settled. ..
By and large, Holmes' position has been rejected, 7 and questions
of law application have been treated in an ad hoc, non-precedential
manner.8 The reasons for this approach reveal the limited usefulness of
expert testimony to a jury in its law application function. 9 First, prece-
dent on law application is not readily accessible. Jury decisions are not
reported, and in any event, law application is often buried in a general
verdict.90 Since the scope of appellate review of such mixed questions of
law and fact is limited,91 reported decisions are likely to be fewer and
narrower than the actual number and range of occasions of law
application.
Second, it is not clear in any event how much light precedent sheds
on questions of law application. Holmes himself recognized this prob-
lem in The Common Law:
The trouble with many cases of negligence is that they are of a kind not frequently
recurring so as to enable any given judge to profit by long experience with juries to
lay down rules, and that the elements are so complex that courts are glad to leave
the whole matter in a lump for the jury's determination.2
The same can easily be said about proximate cause; whether a conse-
quence was "foreseeable" or not in one case does not help a jury to
85. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
86. Id. at 123; see also Weiner, supra note 66, at 1893-94.
87. Louis, supra note 66, at 1021-23.
88. Id. at 1003-07.
89. Judicial application of law to fact may violate the seventh amendment's guarantee of the
right to trial by jury. See Weiner, supra note 66, at 1889-93. Because expert testimony on law
application does not deprive the jury of that role in the same way as judicial intervention, a com-
parable seventh amendment problem is not raised by expert testimony.
90. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 236.
91. Louis, supra note 66, at 998-99, 1003-07 passim.
92. 0. HOLMES, supra note 85, at 129.
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decide whether a different event was foreseeable to a different actor in
a different situation. In those rare cases in which there is clear determi-
native precedent on the issue, its proper use is in a directed verdict, not
as evidence for the trier of fact.
Third, and probably most importantly, in order for society to get
the full benefit of the experience and wisdom of the lay triers of fact,
the jurors must be free to apply the legal standard to the facts afresh.
As the Supreme Court has stated:
[I]t is a matter of judgment and discretion, of sound inference, what is the deduc-
tion to be drawn from the undisputed facts.. . . It is this class of cases and those
akin to it that the law commits to the decision of a jury. Twelve men of the average
of the community, comprising men of education and men of little education, men of
learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have themselves seen
and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together,
consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven,
and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great
effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the com-
mon affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclu-
sions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge .
3
The problem with expert opinion on law application is not that the ex-
pert's testimony "usurp[s] the function of the jury," since, as commen-
tators have pointed out, the jury is free to reject the expert's advice.94
Rather, the concern is that the expert's opinion deflects the jury from
its accepted role of assessing the evidence and applying the law in light
of its collective perceptions, experiences, and community sense of
fairness.
That role requires the jury's application of law to be completely
non-precedential, "like a ticket good for a specific trip only."9 " Al-
though expert testimony on the application of a legal standard does not
remove that function from the jury altogether, as would making the is-
sue a question of law for the court, it does invite the jury to consider
precedent in its decision. One of the reasons our judicial system values
the jury so highly is because a jury does not consider how others have
decided similar cases.
B. Rule 403: Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
Expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause, as with other
mixed questions of law and fact, presents real dangers of misleading the
93. Sioux City & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1873).
94. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 58, § 1920, at 18-21; Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV.
414, 424 (1952).
95. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 236.
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jury, confusing issues, and wasting time. Rule 40398 permits the court to
exclude the testimony when these considerations substantially outweigh
whatever help such testimony might provide.9 As discussed above, the
difference between the legal definition of proximate cause and its ordi-
nary meaning increases the probability that expert opinion on the sub-
ject will mislead the jury.8 Even when the possibility of such
misunderstanding is minimized, expert testimony on proximate cause
has a tendency to confuse the issues by directing the jury's attention to
the evaluation of the expert's credentials, reasoning, and conclusions. If,
as Judge Jack Weinstein contends, "[a]n expert can be found to testify
to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous,"99
litigants should have no problem finding experts willing to opine on
both sides of virtually any law application issue, especially one as open
to debate as proximate cause.100 Paid advocates for each side thus
would appear in the guise of expert witnesses. Parties then would be
forced to contend over the qualifications of their respective experts, the
experts' views of precedent, and the application of precedent to the
facts of the case.10 The overriding danger is that, by virtue of the pres-
ence of the contending experts in the case, the jury will view its task as
deciding the relative impressiveness and wisdom of the experts instead
of the issue of law application itself. Further weighing in the balance is
the time, and party expense, such testimony would consume.'
96. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
97. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.4 (2d ed. 1986); D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 34, § 382, at 643; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, 702[01];
Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate As-
surance of Trustworthiness, 1986 ILL L. REV. 43, 47 (1986); Pratt, A Judicial Perspective on Opin-
ion Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 39 WASH. & LEE L. RE v. 313, 326, 331 (1982).
98. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
99. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473, 482 (1986).
100. Dissatisfaction with psychiatric testimony in criminal cases phrased in terms of the legal
standard, primarily on the issue of the accused's sanity, led Congress to enact Rule 704(b) in 1984.
See supra note 37. According to the Senate Report, "[t]he purpose of this amendment is to elimi-
nate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory con-
clusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.. . . 'Determining whether a
criminal defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal fact-finders, not for experts.'" S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-31 (1983).
101. See Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861
(1977) (indicating that "we must be especially careful not to allow trials before juries to become
battles of paid advocates posing as experts on the respective sides concerning matters of domestic
law").
102. See Pratt, supra note 97, at 315 (suggesting that "if a witness' opinion, even when based
on her perception, does no more than draw an inference from facts readily expressed from the
witness stand, it is not truly 'helpful' and, therefore, may be excluded as a 'waste of time' ").
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Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal
courts generally have barred expert opinion on law application based on
the authority of Rules 702 and 403. Thus, courts have precluded expert
testimony that a manufacturer's notice did not provide adequate warn-
ings of a product's dangers,""s that a party's conduct did or did not con-
stitute discrimination,0 4 that previous product sales amounted to prior
public use and prior art under patent law,105 that the facts underlying
an arrest established probable cause. 06 In the case most similar to the
issue of admissibility of expert testimony on proximate cause, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclu-
sion of an expert's opinion on the legal "cause" of an accident. In that
case there was no dispute as to the factual cause, and the court held
that the testimony constituted a legal conclusion that merely told the
jury what result to reach.10 7 Opinions phrased in terms of legal criteria
generally are admitted as helpful only when necessary to convey the
witness' total impression of underlying factual matter.108 In other
words, when expert testimony on factual questions stated in terms
identical to the legal standard comes into evidence, it does so despite
that concordance rather than because of it.
In sum, expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause at best
can do nothing more than provide the expert's view of how the instant
case fits with prevailing precedent. The infusion of precedent on law
103. Strong v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 1981).
104. Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 149-51 (6th Cir. 1985); Ward v. Westland
Plastics, Inc., 651 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247, 1272-74 (8th Cir.
1980).
106. DiBella v. Suffolk County, 574 F. Supp. 151, 152-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), a/I'd, 762 F.2d
1990 (2d Cir. 1985); McArthur v. Robinson, 98 F.R.D. 672, 678 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
107. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1983). In Owen the plaintiff,
a bulldozer operator, claimed that the defendant negligently placed and failed to mark an under-
ground pipeline. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in digging
in the area without ascertaining the exact location of the pipeline. At issue in the case was the
following question asked by defendant's counsel of its expert witness:
Now, Mr. Stone, you have been qualified as an expert in petroleum engineering and opera-
tion, installation and maintenance of gas gathering systems. Now, after hearing all of the
evidence, looking at all of the exhibits, hearing in particular all of the witnesses, primarily
plaintiff's witnesses, do you have any opinion as to the cause of the accident of July 8th,
1978?
Id. at 239.
108. One commentator suggests that an opinion of an expert is helpful only in the following
circumstances:
(1) when an expression of the witness' knowledge can be conveyed in no other form, (2) where
an accurate, total impression was formed by a witness who is unable to account for all the
details upon which it was based, or (3) most importantly where an accounting of the details
by itself alone cannot accurately convey the total impression held by the witness.
M. GRAHAM, supra note 97, § 704.1, at 647.
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application may not be possible and in any event, is of little or no use
to the jury. The only effect, then, of the testimony is "to tell the jury
what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an
earlier day."' 109 At the very least, the expert will be regarded as a "thir-
teenth juror," contributing, if only from the witness stand, to the jurors'
application of the legal standard. Expert advice on how to decide the
case is of no legitimate help to the jury, and merely serves to confuse
the issues, mislead the trier of fact and waste the time and resources of
the parties and the tribunal. Expert opinion phrased in terms of the
existence of "proximate cause" thus seems to fail the tests of admissi-
bility under both Rule 702 and Rule 403.110
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this Article is twofold. On one level, it is quite
clear that an expert witness should not be permitted to give an opinion
on the issue of proximate cause. Although Rule 704(a) permits testi-
mony on an ultimate issue, the Rule does not sanction an opinion
phrased in terms of an inadequately explored legal standard. Further,
109. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1972).
Oath helpers were an important part of the Anglo-Saxon form of trial by oath, known as compur-
gation. A party would swear his own oath to the truth of his claim and the oath helpers would
swear to the truthfulness of the party's oath, or, as it was later refined, to their belief in its truth.
These oath helpers did not need to have personal knowledge of the facts and were originally often
kinsmen of a party. As the rule developed, the accused in a criminal case was not permitted to
choose the oath helpers, nor could his relatives serve in that capacity. The oath helpers were cho-
sen and struck in the manner of a modern petit jury. In this later form, oath helpers thus held a
more impartial relationship to the parties than do present-day expert witnesses. For a concise
description and history of compurgation, see J. THAYER, supra note 66, at 24-30.
110. By contrast, expert testimony on the factual questions underlying the issue of proximate
cause may be quite appropriate. A defendant in a tort action is liable for the risk she should have
perceived in light of both her own knowledge and experience as well as what a reasonable person in
her position would have perceived. James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence
Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 12-14 (1951). Expert testimony on whether a particular risk was
foreseeable to the actor may elucidate whether a person with particular skill and experience should
have foreseen a particular risk, or whether or not a consequence could, in light of the practice in a
particular field, be regarded as direct and foreseeable. However, in Garza v. Indiana & Michigan
Electric Co., 338 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1964), which was decided prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the court barred expert opinion on the question of whether an electric power
company should have foreseen that an irrigation pipe might be raised vertically and come into
contact with its power line because the opinion related to an "ultimate fact." Expert testimony on
these essentially factual issues may assist the jury without raising the dangers of opinion phrased
in terms of "proximate cause" itself. This distinction is analogous to the one courts have often
made between testimony on "safe" or "reasonable" practices, which is usually admitted, and con-
clusions about "negligence," which are usually excluded. See, e.g., Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698
F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983); M. GRAHAM, supra note 97, § 704.1, at 648 and cases cited therein.
Expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause, then, should, if otherwise proper, be addressed
to the factual elements such as foreseeability that bear on the jury's application of the legal
standard.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
an opinion on the issue of proximate cause fails to meet either of the
requirements of Rule 702. The typical expert witness called to testify in
a tort action will have no expertise on proximate cause. For this reason
alone, the testimony of such a witness should be barred. Even suppos-
ing the witness' legal expertise, the opinion will not be helpful to the
jury because it contributes nothing but a judgment on how the legal
standard should be interpreted and applied. As to the former, such
norm elaboration is generally treated either as a jury function or as a
task for the court. As to the latter, application of the legal standard to
the facts is the fundamental benefit society seeks to obtain from the use
of lay triers of fact. Thus, expert testimony provides no assistance and
amounts to little more than advice to the jury on what decision it
should reach.
On another level, expert testimony on proximate cause raises a con-
cern about all testimony on an ultimate issue by a legal expert. When a
legal expert testifies on a question of law application, the expert's opin-
ion incorporates her experience with other cases similar to the case at
bar. The result is that the jury is invited to consider prece-
dent-implicitly or explicitly summarized in the expert's conclusion. On
issues of law application, such as proximate cause or the reasonable
man standard, however, our judicial system values the jury precisely
because it does not consider precedent. Permitting a legal expert to tes-
tify as to how others have decided similar cases subtly undermines that
significant value.
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